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        UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOARD D/ MU
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MARTEX FARMS, S.E. : Appeal No. 07-01
    : Docket No. 02-2005-5301
1201 Constitution Avenue, NW. Washington, D.C.
Monday, November 5, 2007
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                        U.S. E.P.A.
    The HEARING in this matter began at approximately 10:03 a.m. pursuant to notice. BEFORE:

JUDGE EDWARD E. REICH

JUDGE ANNA L. WOLGAST
JUDGE KATHIE A. STEIN

## APPEARANCES:

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ALSO PRESENT:
Gary Jonesi
Carl Eichenwald


Honors. Danielle Fidler for Complainant, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, and I'm joined today by Gary Jonesi and Carl Eichenwald, also of OECA.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Thank you. Mr. Zampierollo, if you could begin and also advise the Board as to whether you'll be saving any of your 30 minutes for rebuttal please.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Yes, Your Honor. I will save about five minutes for rebuttal, if necessary.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Thank you.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: We are ready whenever you are ready.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Yes. Please begin.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Thank you. Your Honor, this is a case of selected prosecution, where EPA singled out Martex, while the rest of the Puerto Rico agricultural community is left untouched.

The selection of Martex was made in
bad faith and are objectionable and impermissible consideration to send a strong message to the Puerto Rican community.

Certain not to protect agricultural workers or handlers, but to extract a payment from the respondent that is punitive and not remedial. I would like to make reference to Exhibit 24, Respondent Exhibit 24. This is some remarks made by Ms. Kathleen Callahan in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on or about February 3,2005. This was several days before Martex was served with the complaint. My client didn't know about this when he had to confront the press, and this statement.

However, Ms. Callahan was quoted as saying that she expects Martex Farms to make effort to fix the problems rather than to pay fines.

This is part of the record in this case, Your Honor.

JUDGE REICH: Can I ask for a clarification? Since selective prosecution

## PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Environmental Appeals
Board of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency is now in session for oral
argument In Re Martex Farms, S.E., Docket
Number FIFRA 02-2005-5301, FIFRA Appeal
Number 07-02.
The Honorable Judges Ed Reich, Anna Wolgast, Kathie Stein, presiding. Please be seated.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Good moming.
We're here pursuant to the Board's order of
September 18th, 2007, to hear argument in this FIFRA Civil Penalty matter.

Under that order, each side has 30 minutes for argument. If counsel could please introduce themselves for the record.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Good morning, Your Honor, members of the Board. My name is Romano Zampierollo, and I am counsel for Martex Farms.

MS. FIDLER: Good morning, Your
is really a kind of term of art, are you arguing that you meet the standards for selective prosecution, because I understood your brief at footnote 24 to indicate that the administrative record shows that Martex could not pursue the defense of selective prosecution for lack of an initial showing that the agency had selected the respondent for enforcement action in bad faith based on impermissible consideration, such as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights.

So given that footnote, I'm a little unclear about your reasserting the argument that this was selective prosecution.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Your
Honor, we are reasserting the argument, but we are aware that we could not meet the threshold questions.

JUDGE REICH: Okay.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: We are not talking about constitutional violations
here. But taken as whole, the 10 mistakes
that I'll try to address in a moment point to
the direction that EPA acted on bad faith and other things. So if --

JUDGE STEIN: Could you explain to me what the bad faith is?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT; Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE STEIN: And what specific facts you're alleging constitute bad faith?

MR, ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: I'm referring to Respondent's Reply Brief. For example, Your Honor, look, I will go through all of them.

The complaint is discriminatory. We were singled out. There is no evidence of a local initiative to enforce FIFRA in Puerto Rico or the islands, so we understand that absent this local initiative, everything what EPA said about this matter was just wrong, because there is no local initiative.

JUDGE STEIN: Yeah --

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: We have been --

JUDGE STEIN: I un -- but I understand that EPA has chosen to take an enforcement action against your client, and that you appear to be upset that an action wasn't taken against others; but that given that, you know, the law gives EPA discretion as to, you know, particularly in light of resources, how many enforcement actions to take, I don't understand why they're taking of a single action would amount to bad faith?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well, Your Honor, Martex was inspected by EPRDA, EPA inspectors on March 24th, 2003.

JUDGE STEIN: Right.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: And by one EPA inspector, Mr. Anthony Lammano precisely at the Caoca facility, which is the biggest farm that we have in Santa Isabel municipality. And no violations were found.

Unexpectedly, a couple of weeks or
months later, we received a flurry of visits
and inspections, about four or five in 2003.
And beginning with the April 26th, 2004
inspection, we had about four additional inspections.

So nobody else was being inspected by EPA in the islands.

JUDGE STEIN: So your argument in essence is based on a lack of prior enforcement by EPA?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Based on a lack of -- probably this is the first case EPA has prosecuted pertaining to FIFRA violations. So probably, yes, lack of prior enforcement.

See when we responded to the complaint, and we prepared the pre-hearing exchange of witnesses, we made a particular announcement that we wanted to have several EPA employees present subpoenaed for the trial.

We wanted Mrs. Cathleen Callahan,
who was in San Juan on March the 3rd, 2004; engineer Carl Soderberg; and Mr. Jorge Maldonado, an EPA PRDA ex-inspector, Mr. de Jesus, another inspector, and Ana Delya Martinez, a lady who was -- who has been giving WPS training to Martex since about six or seven years ago; and other EPA personnel. We could not obtain the subpoena order for deposing these witnesses, nor making them appear --

JUDGE STEIN: Is that an argument that you've raised on appeal?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Yes. Yeah. But I'm aware, Your Honor, I'm aware that crop allows to subpoena witnesses, if the particular law allows it.

Unfortunately, under FIFRA, the hearing examiner was not allowed to issue the subpoenas. But that does not change the fact that our hands were tied -- to present witnesses. We could not present witnesses that knew what was the reason behind this
enforcement.
You see --
JUDGE REICH: In terms of that, I mean, since we've already I think heard that you're not arguing selective prosecution in the strict sense, then issues as to liability they may basically come down to factual issues as to whether you were or weren't meeting the applicable standards.

Why are the arguments that you're making, if relevant at all, relevant only to the penalty, which has more an ability to consider equities than the underlying issue of whether or not you're in violation?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well, not necessarily the penalties, Your Honor.

We understand that the inspectors who visited the Cotalarel facility, Mr. Juan Carlos Munoz, and two Saiach or private contractors, they were prejudiced against the company when they did this inspection, because actually when they went to Cotalarel
on April 26th, 2004, the mango harvest was over, but they already had the party to celebrate the harvest. The harvest was over.
And there was nobody there working doing any agricultural activity.

JUDGE REICH: Did the inspectors testify at trial?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Yes.
JUDGE REICH: And I assume they were cross examined?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Oh, yes, Your Honor, at length.

JUDGE REICH: And did the Administrative Law Judge in her decision find their testimony to be credible?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHENFELDT: You see, Your Honor, I have a great respect for Attorney Susan Bero, and I think she's a great judge, but I think that here she made a couple of mistakes.

JUDGE REICH: So that means she did find their testimony to be credible?

I think, Your Honor, that you are right, but the law authorizes this panel of judges to make de novo decisions. And you can go through, if available, through the trial record. There are five volumes this thick.

And sifting through the record, you can "observe" how the witnesses were testifying, because the way the questions were posed and the way the answers were given, you can see that. You can see that.

That's why I'm telling you I think that Judge Bero is an excellent judge, but I think she probably made a mistake here, a couple of mistakes.

I don't -- I'm not sure if I
answered all the questions and I can go ahead?

JUDGE WOLGAST: Well, could you explain to us why you think the judge erred or made mistakes as to liability?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: That's
a tough nut to crack, Your Honor.
You see something that we cannot
leave aside is the fact that EPA
Administrative Law Judge is an EPA employee.
And all the witnesses that were attending this trial or went to testify are either EPA employees or Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture deputized EPA employees.

So there's a common or more common than not interest in having the rule of law, the point of view of the agency sustained or --

JUDGE STEIN: And where in your briefs did you lay out that argument?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: All over the brief, Your Honor. It's-

JUDGE STEIN: That --
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: We were --

JUDGE STEIN: -- your argument is that the proceeding is not fair because the ALJ is an employee of EPA, with certain, you
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know, with all of the protections of the
Administrative Procedures Act?
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: I'm
not saying that, Your Honor. You see these things you cannot take them separated one from the other. It's all --

JUDGE STEIN: Well, in order for us to be able to parse through the materials, and we have parsed through the materials and the testimony, is we need to understand what specific factual finding or conclusion of law is clearly erroneous.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: For example --

JUDGE STEIN: And we've been through the materials, and we've looked at your arguments and if, you know, there are one or two of your arguments that are most important to you that you want to explain a little beyond the briefs, I think that would be helpful to us.

But I do think we need to
understand, you know, in order for us to find that the Administrative Law Judge erred, we need to understand what that clear error might be.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: You
see, Your Honor, as I told at the beginning,
this is a whole procedure, a whole process.
When Ms. Callahan was in San Juan, Puerto Rico and made the announcement about this biggest penalty in U.S. history, she was dealing with something else. She was dealing with the exit of the Navy from Roosevelt Roads and the Vieques.

So the impression many individuals have in Puerto Rico and I share that impression is that the EPA wanted to give a strong warning to the inhabitants of this island.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But, for instance, how did the judge err in finding that the company violated regulatory procedures to provide notice of application in accordance
with 170.122 ?
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Okay, For example, Stipulation Number 23 that is a --

JUDGE WOLGAST: Yes.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: -basic issue in this litigation was interpreted by EPA's counsel, and I also have great respect for Ms. Fidler, but she made a mistake, and the judge. The way -- see we think -- I think in Spanish. I've been living in South America all my life, except for two or three years in Italy, where I went to school. So I think in Spanish, and I translate.

So when I think and something that is written or is going to be written, my first interpretation of that is what I know is in Spanish, not in English.

So if in Stipulation 23, we stated that on April 26th, 2004 no applications of clear out were posted, we were meaning -- I
was thinking that on that particular day, April 26th, not before. But --

JUDGE STEIN: But didn't the judge
find wholly apart from the stipulation, didn't she make a finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude there was liability, even if one were to disregard that stipulation?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well, if you --

JUDGE STEIN: I'm not saying that it would be appropriate to disregard it, but I'm saying that unnecessarily, but I'm saying that above and beyond that stipulation, my reading of the ALJ's opinion is that she found that additional evidence also supported the finding of liability on that point.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well if you eliminate Stipulation Number 23, probably under the first set of first categories of a violation, we would only have violation 150 and 151 , the last two.

In the second category, we won't have violations. The third category, which is the same as the first one, but for handlers, the same situation.

JUDGE REICH: But I don't think that's exactly responsive to the question, because I don't think the question was how you would interpret the effect of not having the stipulation.

I think it was a more direct question about what the ALJ, in fact, found and whether the ALJ did not, in fact, find that even apart from the stipulation, the evidence proved the violations.

MR, ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well for example, for bow come inspection of field JC 11 , or JC 1,1 , the inspectors went there from the main offices of Martex Farms and they didn't notice, on their way to J field -- J 11, that there was huge, gigantic structure that is used to wash fruits and it uses water?

according to EPA's regulations, 17.156, I
believe, and 176, as an alternate method for WPS compliance.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But let's stay with the notice question before we move on to the violations on decontamination supplies.

As to the notice, I understood that what Judge Bero was relying on was that there was no -- the inspectors testified that there was no posting of any pesticide, even though there had been, if there were prior applications, that posting would still have to be there for the ensuing 30 days.

And at the time of the April 26th inspection, they found no postings of any application of a pesticide.

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well the application was -- all the documents were given to EPA in an electronic file. EPA used Exhibit, Complainant Exhibit 21B, to sustain Martex violations. If that is so, and it's
-- and that Exhibit 21B is good for
sustaining those violations, it's also good to sustain that Martex was complying with the law.

JUDGE WOLGAST: How so?
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Becaus e of Federal Rule of Evidence 106. This a rule of faimess, Your Honor.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But what about the exhibit are you relying on for your defense to that finding of violation?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: All
the exhibit, Your Honor, All exhibits -- 21B
that has a complete list of applications.
There's another one. There's an Exhibit 21.

JUDGE REICH: Was the list that's 21B, was that list itself posted someplace?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: I
understand that this list was posted on the butletin board, Your Honor. And this is the information that EPA received in an
electronic file on July 20.
JUDGE REICH: So you're saying the day the inspectors showed up, that particular list was posted on the bulletin board?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: This one?

JUDGE REICH: Yeah.
JUDGE WOLGAST: Did -- who
testified to that effect?
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Well,
Mr. Roberto Rivera, EPA's Inspector, testified that the list was not there. Martex representative, one of the owners, Veny Mardi, Jr., testified that it was there.

JUDGE REICH: Was there and was posted on the bulletin board, both?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: On the bulletin board in the main office. You see to understand this postings, Your Honor, we have to go a little back.

Martex bought this concerns from an Israeli company who used to apply fertilizers
and herbicides with the same crew, with the same supervisor.

The rest of the pesticides that, for example, Kocide, Boa, Trilogy, you name it, they were applied by a different crew. Why? Because this company just thought that that was the proper way to do it.

And my client inherited that procedure. So when a posting of herbicide is sent to the WPS posting, the posting, for example, in this case, Clearout, which is a herbicide, is sent along and probably the next day it's corrected because they really don't know if the pesticide is going to be applied or not.

The rest of the pesticides that are applied by other crews are applied after 4:00 p.m., by another group of people. So the company knows for sure when the posting is there that that pesticides are applied.

So there's a difference. And our agronomist, Mr. Acosta, tried to explain
that, and obviously he was not successful in doing that because the message was not -they don't get through.

JUDGE STEIN: I'd like to ask you a question for a moment about EPA's appeal.

I take it you're aware that EPA has
filed an appeal and cross appeal in this case?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Yes.
JUDGE STEIN: And $I$ take it you also understand that if the Board were to agree that that appeal was well taken, there's a possibility that the penalty in this matter could go up?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Yes, Your Honor, we are aware of that, and we are also aware that in this case, EPA did at least three or maybe four calculations for the penalties.

With the initial complaint, filed on January 28th, 2004, there was a first one; first penalty calculation by Mr. Kramer from

New York.
The complaint was amended on July and again on August, I believe, and new penalty calculations were prepared by EPA.

JUDGE STEIN: All right. MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: After the trial on February 10th, 2006, well after the trial, EPA came up with another set of calculations, and I'm referring, Your Honor, to EPA's Post Hearing Brief, Appendix B.

This is a sworn statement by Mr. Kramer -- well, months after the trial, where he states that he was not aware that he was -- he did not fully consider Attachment 2B of the 1997 interim final work and protection penalty.

He all -- this gentleman also stated that in 20 years working for EPA, it was the first time, first time, he was doing WPS calculation. I asked him, Mr. Kramer, you are practicing with my client? And he said no. And the answer went -- was
disregarded.
He was practicing with Martex. He would -- never, never he did this calculation.

So I really doubt that after all the effort that Adminjstrative Law Judge Bero went or did in this calculation, I doubt that EPA can come with a new set of calculations, because --

JUDGE STEIN: My question isn't really the question about new calculations. My question was to make sure that you were fully aware that as part of EPA's cross appeal, they have challenged a few of the findings of the ALJ, and in particular the fact that they felt that in certain areas an additional penalty should have been assessed. And that is one of the things that the Board will be looking at in rendering its decision in this case?

MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Yes, I'm aware of that, Your Honor, and I'm aware
that for category three, which is failure to -- for this posting for handlers is the same, exactly the same, situation than as workers.

In addition to that, handlers are
four. We have from maybe three to six, but usually we have four handlers, and these gentlemen are Jovine Ortiz, Angel Rosario, Elvis Santiago. You can find their names in the initial decision, page 36. And another individual called PeeWee. His name is in page 21 of the initial decision.

They know what they're doing. They know what they're doing, when they're doing it, why they're doing it, how they're doing it. They know everything about pesticides application.

So it is preposterous to think that these individuals were taken by surprise; that they didn't know what was going in Caoca fields?

JUDGE WOLGAST: Mr. Zampierollo you're out of time for your initial argument.

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We will reserve five minutes for rebuttal.
Thank you.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. FIDLER: Good morning, Your Honors. If it please the Board, 1 would like to spend a few short minutes making an introductory statement, and would then like to use the remainder of my time to address the issues raised by Complainant in its cross appeal.

Your Honors, although respondent paints a picture of complex regulations, purported government conspiracies against it, and a plague of legal errors, this picture would obfuscate what is, in fact, a very straightforward and relatively simple matter.

This case involves one of the largest commercial farms in Puerto Rico. Respondent's farms cover nearly 3,000 acres and employ hundred of people to grow and harvest crops that are sold globally.

1 protective gears -- gear; let them know what's going on and where so they can stay away from it.

The real story here is that Respondent failed to follow the pesticide label requirements, including the worker protection standard, and in doing so, they inherently increased the risk of harm to the health and lives of its workers and handlers.

The heart of this case is perhaps best reflected in the testimony of
Respondent's owners, who testified to their ability to comply with extremely complex European Union regulations so that they could export their produce there; and, yet, after several notices of violation from the Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture and even after 17 this complaint was filed, they haven't bothered to read the worker protection standard.

Mr. Venancio Marti, Jr., one of Respondent's co-owners, testified that he has the near daily use of pesticides. Working with pesticides is hazardous. Several of the pesticides used at Respondent's farms can cause serious injury and can even be lethal if people are exposed to them.

This is why pesticides have labels that, when followed, are designed to minimize the likelihood of exposure.

This is why following the label directions is the law, as set forth under FIFRA 12(a)(2)(g), and why enforcement of that law is absolutely critical.

All registered pesticide labels require agricultural use of that product to comply with the worker protection standard. This standard is designed to protect farm employees from pesticide exposure and the steps required are fairly simple, inexpensive, and are based on commonsense: Train your employees; provide them decontamination supplies; make sure they have22
a Ph.D. in agronomy and his staff includes two people with master's degrees, and yet stated that if the government inspectors do not tell him when he's in compliance with the worker protection standard, "it's impossible for me to know. You guys are the experts."

Despite Respondent's size,
sophistication, and its revenues of over $\$ 10$ million a year, it failed to make certain that its worker and handlers consistently had the basic decontamination supplies of water, soap, and paper towels.

Respondent's appeal would draw attention away from these simple facts with a lot of arguments about whether it was singled out, whether there were alternative methods of compliance, and whether the ALJ erred in using its own admissions against it. But Respondent fails to provide any evidence to support these arguments, which is why the AL. rejected them.

As the ALJ found, even when all of
the evidence presented by Respondent as viewed in a light most favorable to it, the record is clear that respondent repeatedly violated FIFRA and the worker protection standard, and we thus request that Respondent's appeal be denied.

Although Complainant generally agrees with Judge Bero's findings of liability in this case, as this is the first FIFRA worker protection case to come before the Board, and because Respondent appears t $\phi$ have appealed the entire decision, Complainant felt it was necessary to present its views on some of the ALJ's interpretations of the worker protection standard and the relevant penalty policies.

Complainant has thus cross appealed three discrete, but very important issues in the case.

First, Complainant requests that the ALJ's findings regarding whether applications conducted within 30 minutes may 22 Respondent passed a subsequent worker
be combined for purposes of compliance with 1 display requirements set forth at 40 CFR 170.22 and Section 170.22; that this finding be clarified to require that when doing so, the start and end time of the application be listed in the display of pesticide application information.

JUDGE REICH: So you're not objecting to the combination? The only issue is what start time is listed?

MS. FIDLER: That's correct. For purposes of this matter, Complainant has not objected to the combination of the applications taking place within 30 minutes.

JUDGE REICH: Dos that mean that you accept that as an interpretation or you're just choosing not to argue it in this case?

MS. FIDLER: We are choosing not to argue that in this case.

JUDGE REICH: But you're reserving the right to argue it elsewhere?

MS. FIDLER: That's correct.
JUDGE REICH: Okay.
MS. FIDLER: The second issue in Complainant's cross appeal is that the ALJ misinterpreted the law on relevant penalty policies in her analysis of whether 170.122 and 170.222 are dependent claims and, to the extent that she found that -- might have considered them independent abused her discretion in not assessing a civil penalty for Respondent's failure to notify handlers of pesticide application information.

Complainant requests, therefore, that this portion of the assessment be set aside and that a penalty for those 68 counts of liability be added to the $\$ 92,620$ already assessed by the ALJ.

And finally, the ALJ found that, although Respondent was negligent as a legal matter, she reduced Respondent's level of culpability based on a finding that
protection standard inspection and took steps to come into compliance with the worker standard regulations.

These findings, however, are contradicted by the record and Complainant, therefore, asks that her findings be set aside and the Board increase the overall civil penalty accordingly.

I would turn now to an in-depth review of the cross appeal unless there are further questions regarding Respondent's appeal for Complainant.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Yes. Just a quick question. As to the second and third point, precisely what are you asking the Board to do in terms of increasing the penalty.

MS. FIDLER: Penalty. We are asking that the penalty that has been assessed by the ALJ should be a floor; that an additional penalty for each count should be assessed under the relevant penalty policies and applied for the 68 counts of 37
liability for Respondent's failure to notify its handlers of pesticide application information.

Further, to the extent that there's an overall decrease of roughly 10 percent and in one case of 20 percent of the Respondent's liability under the -- the value under the penalty policy for the negligence assessment, because that finding was in error, we request that it be overturned and that the entire penalty be increased accordingly.

JUDGE STEIN: What do those number translate to if we were to do what you're asking us to do?

MS. FIDLER: Roughly -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. I hadn't put out the exact amount, and, of course, the Board has a discretion, but at least another $\$ 65,000$ for the counts at issue. The entire penalty should be increased by at least 10 percent.

We would argue that the maximum penalty should be assessed here, in light of
the harm of the -- the potential harm of the violations, recognizing that this is within the Board's de novo --

JUDGE STEIN: And there is no inability to pay claim in this case?

MS. FIDLER: There is none.
JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
MS. FIDLER: With regard to the ALJ's findings for 170.122 and 170.222 , she found that applications must take place more than 30 minutes apart in order to be considered separate violations under these two provisions.

However, the ALJ did not explain how combined applications should be reflected15 in the WPS records displayed for workers and 16 for handlers, and Complainant is, therefore, worried about the ALJ's holding on this point might be interpreted either by respondent or by the regulated community.

The problem here is that the ALJ's interpretation of time under 120 --
170.122(c) and 170.222 (c) is insufficiently protective of workers and handlers.

The ALJ does note the relationship between the time of the application and the restricted entry interval, or REI, but holds that the time a pesticide is to be applied may be and I quote: "listed on a WPS display in increments of an hour."

She then concludes that a time difference of a half hour or less between the time that individual handlers begin their pesticide application in a particular field does not appear to be a significant factor for determining whether there is a separate application for purposes of the WPS display.

This rationale is extremely troubling as it does not appear to properly interpret the point of the regulatory scheme, and that is to keep employees out of a field both before the pesticide application, during the application, and during the -- after the end of the application during the restricted
entry interval.
JUDGE STEIN: Ms. Fidler, I'm having a little difficulty with this argument, because if I understand it, you have an appealed the AL -- and I may not understand it correctly -- but you haven't appealed the ALJ's finding in this particular case of being to have this, you know, 30 -minute period collapsed in some fashion.

And yet, you're asking us to by interpretation come up with an interpretation that it strikes me might be more appropriate for the agency to do in the form of guidance rather than for the Board to do.

If you are challenging that conclusion, then, of course, we would look at, you know whether we agreed or disagreed but by not challenging the conclusion, it seems to me you're sort of asking for us to do something that I'm not sure the Board is well suited or the appropriate body to do.

MS. FIDLER: As I will lay out in
further detail, the issue here is that there's flexibility -- and the worker protection standard regulations were designed to give flexibility to farm owners in how they were going to comply.

For purposes of this case, and especially because the issue wasn't brought up -- we didn't realize at hearing that this was an issue of concern to the ALJ, the idea that an application a half hour earlier, an application a half hour later could be combined for purposes of the display is not inherently problematic as long as the combination -- if the farm decided to treat that as one application, that isn't forbidden under the rules.

But they would have to make sure that for that entire time, people are kept out of the fields, both before the first application and that it was clear that the end of the application was the half hour later.
about our gratuitously, you know, expressind an opinion on that issue.

MS. FIDLER: The -- it's not -- the idea here isn't that we would come-that the a -- that Complainant intends to come back and revisit this exact issue.

It's just that there might be a
situation where, for example, there - a
farm, in this case, Respondent chose to lists these applications as separate.

And in the future, a farm might have an application that's listed as separate; sends somebody in for early entry for the second one unprotected.

The point here is not that we would go against the ruling, what we're trying to make sure happens here is that to the extent that a farm chooses to have an application be one, that are within 30 minutes that it's interpreted consistently with the regulatory scheme of keeping people out before, during and after -- and until the end of the
restricted entry interval.
JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that the kind of thing the agency typically would do by guidance rather than asking this Board to offer an opinion on that topic?

I mean, it strikes me that there are a host of examples across different statutes where, to the extent that the agency has a concern of that nature, they would issue guidance in some form in a place that frankly people are probably -- people affected by the regulation may be probably more likely to see it, you know, than hidden in a footnote somewhere in a Board decision

So I don't want to beat this, you
know, kind of literally horse to death here, but it does (off mike)

MS. FIDLER: If I can, Your Honor, I'd just like to set out an example of this is actually how the regulatory scheme exists and should be interpreted.

The point here is that, yes,
guidance is a better way perhaps of handling these sorts of confusions, but to the extent this can also take decades to issue new guidance. And the fear here is that we're not sure how Respondent is going to view the ALJ's holding as it regards Respondent.

And to the extent that any members of the regulated community would look at this opinion and misinterpret it, the harm here is not a theoretical one. It's a very real one.
So the point here in asking the Board to step in is to make sure that the interpretation, which I think the ALJ actually intended to read it in the scheme, but it didn't quite come out that way.

And so, for example, the intent of the -- I'm sorry -- the intent of the regulation is actually fairly clear when looked at as whole. 171.22 and 222 are, when they're read in conjunction with the other notification provisions, it's not that this -- that the request here, the time be the
start time and the end time is unclear.
So, for example, the need here is to -- the point of the worker protection standard is, in part, one of the main points is to keep people out of treated areas.

And this is done in two ways. The first way is to provide notice. Notification can be oral or can be posted or both depending on the label, and it's clear from -- and I'll -- this is 170.120 -- that the intention here is that from the -- and this is $120(\mathrm{~b})(3)(\mathrm{i})$.

Notice need not be given to a worker if the agricultural employer can assure that one of the following is met. From the start of the application until the end of the application and during any restricted entry interval the worker will not enter, work in, remain in, or pass through on foot the treated area or any area within a quarter mile of the treated area.

The second method of notifying
workers and one of the only ways of notifying handlers if handler isn't making the particular application follows in 170.122 and 170.222.

And I'm sorry just to reiterate what 170.120 , the notifi -- oral warning requires that this information needs to include the location and description of the treated area, the time during which entry is restricted, and instructions not to enter the treated area until the restricted entry interval has expired.

When looking at 170.222 , essentially this enhances the oral notifications that are provided and adds extra requirements that are designed to provide necessary information should a medical emergency arise.

So the same information is required under 170.122 as is required under 170.120 . In terms of the required information -- this is 170.122 (c) -- shall include the location
and description of the treated area, the product name, EPA registration number and active ingredients, the time and date the pesticide is to be applied, the restricted entry interval for the pesticide.

The sum total is if the time and date doesn't convey either at the start the estimated start and end time or you list the start time and you go back and update the records to reflect the end time, the requirement for the restricted entry interval is almost meaningless, because it has to run according to the regulations, from the immediate end of the application.

So what we're asking is that the Board just reinforce what is already there in the regulatory scheme.

JUDGE STEIN: Is this something that the agency asked the ALJ to clarify in her opinion?

MS. FIDLER: No, it did not. JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And just to summarize your argument, what I understand you say is that you're not taking issue with what 1 read to be the main premise of the ALJ's point here was that when someone begins an application in one corner of a field and someone else begins an application 15 minutes later in another corner of a field that that could be treated as an application, a single application for purposes of these notice requirements.

But rather, you're saying that the instigation of the application began with person 1, whomever is the earliest person to apply the pesticide?

MS. FIDLER: That's correct. If it please the Board, I would turn to the ALJ's penalty assessment unless there are further questions on this point?

Your Honors, if the Complainant has cross appealed the ALJ's penalty assessment in this matter for three reasons.

The first is that the ALJ's penalty assessment findings on the issue of Respondent's liability for failing to notify handlers of pesticide application information and on the issue of Respondent's culpability were the result of clear error and abuse of discretion, and, thus, should be set aside as a legal matter.

The second and perhaps more important concern is that her penalty assessment, if allowed to stand, would create a perverse incentive for Respondent and other regulated entities to make less of an effort to protect its workers and handlers from potential exposure to pesticides rather than more, a policy that is -- that clearly undermines the point of worker protection standards.

Finally, the ALJ's holding also takes away the incentive for parties to come into immediate compliance, not after a complaint is filed, but immediately upon
notification of the violation.
And it also takes away the
incentive to settle cases, since essentially if she allows the carrot for such good behavior to be used after a violating entity has waited until the stick of litigation has been applied.

So using the $\$ 92,620$ as a floor, Complainant, therefore, requests that the Board set aside the ALJ's penalty assessmen on this point, and use its de novo authority to establish a higher penalty consistent with the penalty policies.

Asfa primary matter with regard to the ALJ's penalty assessment with regard to failing to assess counts for $\mathbf{1 7 0 . 2 2 2}$, it is unclear even from the start of the opinion whether the ALJ believes that she is following the FIFRA penalty policy or is justifying a departure there from.

Thus, the ALJ fails to meet even the threshold requirement that a departure
from the penalty policy must be clear and compelling. The ALJ's decision on this point commences by misquoting the FIFRA enforcement policy by stating that the agency may assess separate penalties for independent violations of FIFRA.

However, there is no such discretionary language in FIFRA, and l've -it's here.

This provision starts out by stating that a separate civil penalty up to the statutory maximum shall be assessed for each independent violation of the act. So where the complaint has made an allegation of independent counts, a penalty must be assessed.

A valuation is independent if it results from an act or failure to act which is not the result of any other charge for which a civil penalty is to be assessed or if the elements of proof of the violations are different.

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JUDGE REICH: And you're not questioning that she could choose to vary from that if she made a justification for doing so?

MS. FIDLER: If that justification had support in the record, yes.

JUDGE STEIN: Am I correct in understanding that part of the reason that she didn't assess a separate penalty was she viewed the violations as dependent in some fashion?

MS. FIDLER: Yes. That's -- that is also how we how interpreted it, and, however, this is -- this is a misinterpretation and misapplication of the law on dependency and the penalty policies a issue.

Much like the language here in the FIFRA penalty policy, the concept of dependence, as the Board held in re Consume Scrap, the dependent violations in the context of a single statutory provision can
best be described in a you can't have B without first having had A kind of relationship.

At issue in that case were two provisions of the Clean Air Act. 40 CFR 82.156 required the Respondent to take certain records, and 40 CFR 82.166 required the Respondent to keep those records.

And as the Board held, you can't keep records if you haven't made them in the first place, and, thus, they are dependent violations.

However, unlike Consumer Scrap, the regulations at issue are two totally independent unrelated provisions with separate requirements. Just because one is a worker-employer and has workers on the establishment within 30 days of a pesticide application does not inherently mean that one is also a handler-employer, and there are handlers on the establishment within 30 days of the pesticide application.

This view is reflected also in the FIFRA penalty policy.

So the ALJ decides that while the two sets of violations are legally separate, she notices that there are different requirements for the two. She decides that they seem to be factually dependent in this case.

It appears that she thinks that the FIFRA penalty policy thus gives her discretion to combine -- to merge the counts. But the ALJ is confusing the obligation here.

She seems to think that the obligation is to have one central posting area. But there are really two obligations here.

The obligation is to provide your workers with pesticide application information. And second is to provide your handlers with pesticide application information.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Could the notice in 22
each instance have been performed via a single posting?

MS. FIDLER: In this case, the Respondent keeps one central posting area.

There was testimony from the handlers that there was concern whether this was actually an appropriate set up because there's testimony that workers were actually driving directly to the field, and handlers were going to the workshop. So nobody was using the area that they had chosen or that was the fear of the inspectors given their impression when they were there.

But, yes, technically, and the Agency allows that if there is a central area that both workers and handlers are using, yop can use that one area.

But that doesn't change -- that doesn't change the legal obligation to make sure both of those groups are being actively notified of what's going on.

This is so key. I mean, ideally,
you'd want to have -- in this case if the workers are driving to the field, you'd want to have the information posted for those workers in the field.

And if the handlers are using the workshop, you want them to be posting that information for handlers at the workshop.

The result of this is that the ALJ's holding essentially incentivizes doing less instead of doing more, doing what's necessary to keep people out of the -- out of danger.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Well, the Agency, though, didn't allege that it was insufficient notice to post at the central workshop, did they?

MS. FIDLER: That's correct. JUDGE WOLGAST: Did or did not? MS. FIDLER: We didn't -- the Complainant did not allege that it could not use that central area -- location area. Finally, the ALJ seems to imply
that even if she were to have considered these to be independent violations and to assess a separate penalty under the relevant penalty policies, she found that there's no significantly increased harm for failing to notify a few handlers then for failing hundreds of workers.

This finding is flawed for several reasons. First, there is programmatic harm here, as Dr. Enache testified to. But she never once addresses why the penalty policies do not adequately take into account her concerns. Why there couldn't have been adjustments made to what she thought the harm was, and at least have applied some penalty for failing to notify handlers.

Second, she does not give a pressing need to depart from the penalty policy in the first place. She has in no way shown that assessing a penalty for both sets would violate -- both sets of violation would violate equity concems. There's no
inability to pay issue here.
And third, by failing to assess a penalty, she undermines the entire programmatic scheme and gives absolutely nd value whatsoever to the health or life of a handler versus that of a worker. Even if it's one person, if that person had died or had been seriously injured, there was a value there.

Therefore, her penalty deserves no deference by the Board, and we request that an additional penalty be assessed for each of these counts of failing to notify handlers.

Another point that she had made was-and -- that Respondent made -- makes today is that the handler in these questions would know who supervised the application.

But the point isn't about just what was applied that day. It's about the past 30 days. And the ALJ seems to ignore the testimony by Dr. Enache about the need to have that data available in case of emergency
so that take it with it to the -- take it with you to the doctor.

And the importance of these regulations can been seen by public data made available in the -- by the California Department of Pesticide Regulation which tracks these types of injuries and has found in 2004, 18 pesticide exposure cases resulting from early entry violations, one of these cases involving a field worker who got sick eating some grapes in a field he had sprayed with a pesticide the day before, but the application hadn't been put in the records.

It can happen. It does happen. It is important that these groups of people be notified.

Your Honor, if -- I see that I've run out of time. May I take a couple of extra minutes to address the final point?

JUDGE WOLGAST: Yes, briefly. MS. FIDLER: Thank you. With
regard to the ALJ's assessment of culpability, the ALJ found that the Respondent's worker protection violations were the result of negligence, but that Respondent took steps to prevent the violation from recurring.

She based this conclusion largely on self-serving statements that Respondent made at hearing, and testimony that, for example, upon notification that decontamination supplies were missing for handlers, the Respondent's farm manager went out and bought a towel, when there were, in fact, seven handlers working that day. And each one is required to have a clean towel.

Her basis is also refuted by the record, which demonstrates clearly that the visit in 2005 was in no way a full worker protection inspection.

Even more revealing perhaps on this point is the testimony of Respondent's co-owner in his description of that visit.

He said that they received an inspection that they tried to do and they came on Monday to check our farm to find out how many things did we still have without fixing it.

And frankly speaking, I was surprised, because they tried to do it, and God didn't give them a -- give the chance to them, because we were in a dry period and we have rain and rain, and they couldn't do the job, but couldn't. The next day was rain and rain, and another day rain and rain, so the doctor he couldn't look at the farm, so God is with us. That's why we have been successful.

JUDGE REICH: Apart from the question of whether or not the record supports the factual findings, is there an issue of whether those are even appropriate considerations to be taken into account in setting the penalty?

MS. FIDLER: I'm sorry. Can -- I --
steps to come into compliance, not someone who waited until after a complaint was filed to make some efforts -- we're not even sure that they're complying with anything besides than what they've been told to comply with. JUDGE STEIN: Does the FIFRA penalty policy speak to that? But if 1 recall correctly, the RICRA penalty policy had some language that coming into compliance after the fact is not good faith. And I'm wondering if there's any kind of an analogue in FIFRA?

MS. FIDLER: I don't have that prepared. I'm happy to submit a brief to the Board.

JUDGE STEIN: No, I just wanted to know if you knew.

MS. FIDLER: 1 am not aware of any currently, but I'm happy to reevaluate that.

Thank you. Thank you, Your Honors.
MR. ZAMPIEROLLO-RHEINFELDT: If it please the court, yes, I just want to address

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JUDGE REICH: Whether the kinds of considerations that you're discussing; that is, those taken to prevent reoccurrence are legitimate considerations to be taken into account, which, to me, it's a question you have to address before you get into what the record suggests about those issues.

MS. FIDLER: That's correct. And as we pointed out in our brief, the -essentially what the ALJ seems to be doing is crediting the Respondent here with taking steps after -- not only after the violation happened, but after the complaint was filed And what the point of the assessment is to assess negligence at the time of the violation. And here it was clear at the time of violation that the Respondent had several notices of violation and this subsequent inspection. So to even go to that point is essentially trying to give a break that is normally reserved for someone doing settlement or someone who immediately too 22
a couple of issues raised by counsel Fidler, very briefly.

The first one has to do with application of pesticides in a given field. Some applications begin at let's say 8:00 a.m., and the other one in the same field continues $8: 30,9: 30$ p.m. That depends on the length of the field. That's an agricultural practice consideration, not something that must be set up or decided here in Washington in EPA's headquarters.

How a business, an agribusiness, is run is a decision that has to be made by agronomists in the field.

So if Judge Bero determined what she determined pertaining to the hours of application is a technical matter, and depends on the length or the area of the field.

Our fields are divided in relatively small fields because we have to keep a precise control of what is sprayed for
our European markets. So we have to be very careful about that. That's the reason why fields are so small.

But if we want to go around the acres. So it would be one violation. That's ridiculous.

So we are -- I don't want this Board to get involved into a discussion of semantics. This is not the issue. The issue is the application of pesticides is a technical matter. It's response to particular crops, to particular pesticides.

So if you start spraying a field at 8:00 a.m., the reentry time depending on the pesticide is either four hours for clear out or Trilogy T24 hours or whatever, depends when the field was sprayed. If the field is very long, and it takes five day, then (off mike) regulation would suggest that you for reentry, you have to wait seven days for the -- in the case of trilogy to have not reentry
(off mike) particular eye flushing devices for personnel.

But the fact is that the first part of that field was sprayed eight or 10 or 15 days before. So it makes no sense unless to have that regulation apply in the way EPA wants, because it's -- the length of the field is very important. If the field is very small, then a particular consideration takes place. If the field is very large, or long in that case, the same area but a very long field, it's different.

We have, as I stated before, (off mike) four handlers and they exactly know what, where, when, why, how those pesticides are applied. So having them go on and read in a central posting station what they're going to do, what they did the day before, what they did -- they know, because they are the only pesticide handlers.

In terms of Judge Bero's determination of penalties, the

Administrative Law Judge went to great pains trying to figure out a sensible way of applying penalties.

The maximum was set after the third or fourth revision at $\$ 1,100$ per violation. But she was asking look what happens if somebody dies at the field. Do we impose a higher penalty? We can't, because the penalty is already fixed.

So it does not matter if you have injuries, if the community is affected, nothing, because the penalty is already there, and that makes no practical sense.

We have to, we have to, after so many years with EPA, dealing with these matters (off mike) 1968, we should start to rethink our involvement or EPA's involvemert in these matters because if the idea of the law, of the purpose of the law is to protect workers and handlers and the communities, then we should do that.

EPA received documents in August
2004. They waited eight months to file a complaint.

Look if Martex was doing things so badly, they should have stopped the company the next day, and said look you cannot apply those pesticides the way you are doing it. So you are out of business. They didn't do that.

The way I feel is I think that the agency really was trying to make a point, to send a message, and it took Martex as an example. Thank you.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Thank you. Thank you for the arguments, and the case is submitted.

THE CLERK: All rise. This session of the Environmental Appeals Board now stand adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the
HEARING was adjourned.)

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